A visual, playable course

Game theory, played

Start with two people in separate rooms. Build up to auctions, matching markets, and the math behind them. You play first, then the idea and the proof follow.

Progress

Basic

0/19

The shared spine. Static games, equilibrium, sequential play.

Foundations

1

What is a game?

2

Rationality and common knowledge

3

Preferences and expected utility

Static solution concepts

4

Dominant and dominated strategies

5

Rationalizability and best response

6

Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

7

The Prisoner's Dilemma

8

Classic 2x2 games

9

Mixed strategies and mixed Nash

10

Existence of Nash equilibrium

11

Zero-sum games and minimax

A8

Mixed strategies in sportCase

Applications and equilibrium selection

12

Schelling and focal points

A5

Co-opetition and platformsCase

13

Cournot and Bertrand

14

Public goods and the commons

Sequential games

15

Extensive form and backward induction

16

Subgame perfection and commitment

A4

Entry deterrence in businessCase

Intermediate

0/21

Repetition, incomplete information, auctions, information design, contracts.

Correlation and complementarities

17

Correlated equilibrium

18

Supermodular games

Bargaining

19

Nash bargaining

20

Strategic bargaining

A7

Bargaining and negotiationCase

Repeated games

21

Repeated games and discounting

A9

The commonsCase

22

A6

The roots of cooperationCase

23

Repeated games with imperfect monitoring

24

Incomplete information

25

Bayesian games and Bayes-Nash

26

Auctions: first and second price

27

Common values and the winner's curse

Dynamic information and communication

28

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

29

Signaling games

30

Adverse selection and screening

31

Information design and contracts

32

Information design and Bayesian persuasion

33

Contract theory and moral hazard

A11

Contracts and the lawCase

Expert

0/33

Refinements, mechanism design, cooperative theory, dynamics, computation, and behavioral game theory.

Refinements and epistemics

34

Sequential equilibrium and refinements

35

Epistemic foundations

36

Mechanism design and social choice

37

Social choice: Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite

38

Mechanism design and the revelation principle

39

40

Optimal auctions

41

Implementation and Myerson-Satterthwaite

42

Auctions III: position auctions

A2

Auctions in the wildCase

Cooperative game theory

43

Coalitional games and the core

44

The Shapley value

45

Matching and market design

46

Stable matching

47

Top trading cycles

A1

Matching markets in the wildCase

48

School choice and design without money

Evolution and learning

49

Evolutionarily stable strategies

50

Replicator dynamics

51

Stochastic stability and conventions

52

Learning in games

Algorithmic game theory

53

The complexity of equilibria

54

Congestion and potential games

55

Price of anarchy and Braess's paradox

56

Network and graphical games

Behavioral and experimental

57

Limited reasoning: level-k

58

Quantal response equilibrium

59

Social preferences: fairness

60

Reciprocity and intentions

61

Cooperation and punishment

62

Learning and adaptation

63

Field tests and boundaries

64

Culture, context, and design

Applied

0/3

Game theory in the wild: real cases from markets to security.

Game theory in the wild

A3

Deterrence and brinkmanshipCase

A10

Political economyCase

A12

Security games and multi-agent AICase