Game Theory, Played
The dependency graph

Concept map

How the lessons build on each other. An arrow shows a suggested learning path. Every lesson is open, and finishing one fills in its circle.

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Each circle is a lesson, numbered as in the list below. Arrows point from a prerequisite to the lesson that builds on it. Tap a circle to open it, or scroll the graph sideways to follow a track.

What is a game?1Rationality and common knowledge2Preferences and expected utility3Dominant and dominated strategies4Nash bargaining19Rationalizability and best response5Social choice: Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite37Coalitional games and the core43Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium6The Shapley value44Stable matching46The Prisoner's Dilemma7Cournot and Bertrand13Extensive form and backward induction15Congestion and potential games54Limited reasoning: level-k57The nucleolus45Top trading cycles47Classic 2x2 games8Public goods and the commons14Subgame perfection and commitment16School choice and design without money48Price of anarchy and Braess's paradox55Matching markets in the wildA1Mixed strategies and mixed Nash9Schelling and focal points12Repeated games and discounting21Entry deterrence in businessA4Network and graphical games56Social preferences: fairness59Strategic bargaining20Existence of Nash equilibrium10Evolutionarily stable strategies49Quantal response equilibrium58Co-opetition and platformsA5Cooperation and punishment61Deterrence and brinkmanshipA3Political economyA10Folk theorems22Bargaining and negotiationA7Reciprocity and intentions60Zero-sum games and minimax11Learning in games52The complexity of equilibria53Correlated equilibrium17Supermodular games18Bayesian games and Bayes-Nash25Replicator dynamics50Repeated games with imperfect monitoring23Reputation24The roots of cooperationA6The commonsA9Mixed strategies in sportA8Stochastic stability and conventions51Security games and multi-agent AIA12Learning and adaptation62Field tests and boundaries63Epistemic foundations35Perfect Bayesian equilibrium28Global games36Auctions: first and second price26Adverse selection and screening30Signaling games29Cheap talk31Mechanism design and the revelation principle38Common values and the winner's curse27Contract theory and moral hazard33Culture, context, and design64Sequential equilibrium and refinements34Information design and Bayesian persuasion32VCG mechanisms39Optimal auctions40Implementation and Myerson-Satterthwaite41Contracts and the lawA11Auctions III: position auctions42Auctions in the wildA2
Basic
1What is a game?2Rationality and common knowledge3Preferences and expected utility4Dominant and dominated strategies5Rationalizability and best response6Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium7The Prisoner's Dilemma8Classic 2x2 games9Mixed strategies and mixed Nash10Existence of Nash equilibrium11Zero-sum games and minimax12Schelling and focal points13Cournot and Bertrand14Public goods and the commons15Extensive form and backward induction16Subgame perfection and commitment
Intermediate
17Correlated equilibrium18Supermodular games19Nash bargaining20Strategic bargaining21Repeated games and discounting22Folk theorems23Repeated games with imperfect monitoring24Reputation25Bayesian games and Bayes-Nash26Auctions: first and second price27Common values and the winner's curse28Perfect Bayesian equilibrium29Signaling games30Adverse selection and screening31Cheap talk32Information design and Bayesian persuasion33Contract theory and moral hazard
Expert
34Sequential equilibrium and refinements35Epistemic foundations36Global games37Social choice: Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite38Mechanism design and the revelation principle39VCG mechanisms40Optimal auctions41Implementation and Myerson-Satterthwaite42Auctions III: position auctions43Coalitional games and the core44The Shapley value45The nucleolus46Stable matching47Top trading cycles48School choice and design without money49Evolutionarily stable strategies50Replicator dynamics51Stochastic stability and conventions52Learning in games53The complexity of equilibria54Congestion and potential games55Price of anarchy and Braess's paradox56Network and graphical games57Limited reasoning: level-k58Quantal response equilibrium59Social preferences: fairness60Reciprocity and intentions61Cooperation and punishment62Learning and adaptation63Field tests and boundaries64Culture, context, and design
Applied
A1Matching markets in the wildA2Auctions in the wildA3Deterrence and brinkmanshipA4Entry deterrence in businessA5Co-opetition and platformsA6The roots of cooperationA7Bargaining and negotiationA8Mixed strategies in sportA9The commonsA10Political economyA11Contracts and the lawA12Security games and multi-agent AI